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Abstract: Law enforcers frequently issue warnings, as opposed to sanctions,
when they detect first-time offenders. However, virtually all of the law and
economics literature dealing with optimal penalty schemes for repeat offenders
suggest that issuing warnings is a sub-optimal practice. Another observed phe-
nomenon is the joint use of warnings and sanctions in law enforcement: person
A may receive a sanction, whereas person B is only warned for committing the
same offense. This situation can be explained through the use of hybrid warning
strategies, a concept not yet formalized in the law enforcement literature, where
law enforcers issue warnings to x% and sanctions to ð100 xÞ% of first-time
offenders. This article uses a two-period optimal deterrence model to provide a
rationale as to why it may be optimal to issue warnings. When uninformed
individuals are present and their punishment is assumed to be costly, there is
a trade-off between such costs and reduced levels of deterrence. Depending on
the cost structure associated with the punishment of uninformed individuals,
warning strategies, including hybrid ones, may be optimal. A secondary con-
tribution of this article is to point out that lack of information concerning laws
may lead to optimal escalating punishments for repeat offenders.
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1 Introduction
[P]unishment must be inefficacious … [w]here the penal provision, though established,
is not conveyed to the notice of the person on whom it seems intended that it should
operate. … [P]unishment ought not to be inflicted … [w]here it must be inefficacious.1
Jeremy Bentham (1789)
1 Bentham (1789), Chapter 13, section iii.
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More than 200 years ago, Bentham hinted at why sanctions should not be
imposed when people are provided with insufficient notice regarding the illeg-
ality of criminalized behavior. One way modern law enforcers heed Bentham’s
suggestion is by the use of warnings. By issuing warnings, law enforcers forgo
the opportunity of sanctioning a person who committed an illegal act. However,
leaving aside a few exceptions, the existing law and economics literature deal-
ing with optimal penalty schemes for repeat offenders suggests that issuing
warnings is a sub-optimal practice.2
For high-harm offenses where an overwhelmingly large proportion of society
is informed of the illegality of the offense, such as murder and rape, the
literature on repeat offenders provides the correct result, which is also consistent
with actual enforcement policy: murderers and rapists are not warned. But, for
low-harm crimes where a proportion of society may lack information, actual
enforcement policy is inconsistent with the implications of most of the existing
economic theory. Officers sometimes warn people for illegal U-turns, and admin-
istrative officers may warn businesses for violating minor regulations.
In this article, I construct an economic model that provides rationales as to
when and why using warnings may be socially desirable and derive the
Benthamite conclusion cited above, namely that “punishment ought not to be
inflicted” where “the penal provision, though established, is not [properly] con-
veyed.”3 Specifically, by using an optimal deterrence model – as in Polinsky and
Shavell (2007) – I demonstrate that warnings ought to be used more frequently
when society has less information concerning the illegality of the criminalized act.
For this purpose, I incorporate hybrid warning strategies, which have not yet
been formalized in the literature despite their frequent use. Hybrid warning
strategies refer to cases where law enforcers issue warnings x% of the time
and sanctions ð100 xÞ% of the time. This is consistent with cases where person
A receives a sanction for a particular offense, like speeding, where person B
is only warned, even though he commits the same act.4 To derive the
2 Two exceptions are Emons (2007) and Rousseau (2009) which are discussed later in this
section. For models dealing with optimal penalty schemes for repeat offenders see Chu et al.
(2000), Emons (2003, 2004), Miceli and Bucci (2005), Mungan (2010, 2012), Polinsky and
Shavell (1998), and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991). For a general review of the law and
economics literature on law enforcement, see Garoupa (1997), Polinsky and Shavell (2000),
and Polinsky and Shavell (2007).
3 Bentham (1789), Chapter 13, section iii.
4 Police officers may use discretion in issuing warnings. Section 4.5 contains a few comments
regarding the use of discretion, but the theoretical part of this article abstracts from the issue
and shows that hybrid warnings can be optimal even at the absence of discretion. For an
economic analysis and discussion of the determination of optimal discretion, see Shavell (2007).
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Benthamite conclusion summarized above, I show that the optimal x is (weakly)5
decreasing in the number of individuals informed about the illegality of the
criminalized act.
I exploit two assumptions to derive this result. First, to incorporate the
informative value of warnings, I assume that individuals may be uninformed
of the illegality of various acts, and that warnings may provide adequate notice
of the relevant laws.6 Second, I assume that there are costs associated with the
punishment of uninformed individuals. This is an unusual variant of the often
employed assumption in the law and economics literature that there are costs
associated with the punishment of the innocent.7 Therefore, further elaboration
on this assumption is warranted.
Existing criminology literature identifies various costs associated with unfair
procedures.8 In particular, previous empirical studies provide support for the
hypothesis that unfair procedures lead to a perception of low legitimacy of
authorities,9 which is often used as a synonym for lack of trust in government.10
Low legitimacy and lack of trust in government, in turn, have been found to be
linked to a greater likelihood of participation in strikes,11 willingness to engage in
5 The relationship is weak because of corner solutions. More precisely, when the illegality of an
act is unknown to a proportion of society exceeding a critical proportion (α), it is optimal to use
pure warnings (i.e. x ¼ 100). Accordingly, for proportions above this threshold, the optimal x is
constant at 100. A similar result holds when the proportion of uninformed individuals is below
a certain threshold (α), in which case the optimal x is constant at 0. x is strictly increasing in the
proportion of uninformed individuals (α) when α > α > α. This result is discussed in further
detail in Section 2, infra.
6 Warnings, in general, are meant to give notice to or caution individuals who are presumed to
lack information regarding a certain issue. (See Black’s Law Dictionary’s (8th ed. 2004) defini-
tion of warning: ‘The pointing out of a danger, esp. to one who would not otherwise be aware
of it.’)
7 Articles invoking the assumption that there are costs associated with such judicial errors
include Stigler (1970), Posner (1973), Png (1986), Miceli (1990), Chu et al. (2000), and Lando
(2009). See also Mungan (2011) and Rizzolli and Saraceno (2011), providing utilitarian
justifications for the assumption that there are costs associated with the punishment of the
innocent.
8 See, e.g. Folger and Konovsky (1989), Konovsky and Cropanzano (1991), and Tyler (1990),
studying the negative effects of unfair procedures.
9 Sunshine and Tyler (2003:513), for instance, state that “the key antecedent of legitimacy is the
fairness of the procedures used by the police”.
10 See, e.g. Tyler (1990:28): “A[n] approach to assessing legitimacy is to measure the extent to
which authorities enjoy the public’s support, allegiance, and confidence (in political science
often subsumed under the heading ‘trust in government’)”.
11 Seligson (1980).
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violent protests,12 land invasions,13 non-responsiveness to military discipline,14
non-compliance with authorities,15 and other socially costly behavior.16
It is plausible to assume that individuals perceive legal procedures to be
‘unfair’ when they are punished despite being uninformed about the illegality of
their actions. This assumption is supported by the presumption that “the offen-
der defines a criminal sanction as unfair” when he believes that the sanction is
undeserved,17 and presumably an offender is less likely to feel he deserves a
sanction when he lacks knowledge of the illegality of his actions. As such, I will
assume that the punishment of uninformed individuals leads to social costs by
weakening the social ties between citizens and law enforcers.
When uninformed individuals are present and their punishment is assumed
to be costly, issuing warnings can be an optimal practice. Issuing actual fines for
first-time offenders has two primary functions: deterrence of informed first-time
offenders and informing a fraction of uninformed first-time offenders. However,
this comes at the cost of punishing uninformed individuals. On the other hand,
warnings only inform a fraction of uninformed first-time offenders and they lack
the deterrent function of actual fines; however, they do not generate costs
associated with the punishment of the uninformed. Hence, if the cost of punish-
ing uninformed individuals outweighs the benefits from increased deterrence of
informed first-time offenders, issuing warnings is an optimal practice. Moreover,
in certain cases, it may be possible to employ hybrid warning strategies to
balance expected costs associated with the punishment of uninformed indivi-
duals and costs associated with under-deterrence.
Results obtained in this article are relevant for designing guidelines for the
use of warnings. In particular, the possibility of mitigating losses due to the
punishment of uninformed individuals, without resorting to discretion, leads
one to believe that the benefits of non-discretionary regimes may be under-
stated. This article also allows a discussion of how warning strategies should
evolve as a function of the age of the law. Presumably, the older the law, the
more knowledge there is concerning it. Hence, as a law gets older, the necessity
of using warnings in its enforcement is reduced. Furthermore, the government
12 See, e.g. Worchel et al. (1974).
13 Seligson (1980).
14 See, e.g. Wesbrook (1980).
15 Tyler (1990:58) finds that “[t]he results of the regressions suggest that legitimacy has a
significant independent effect on compliance, even when other potential causal factors are
controlled for”. See also Sunshine and Tyler (2003).
16 Tyler (1990:34-36) provides a list of studies examining the link between concepts related to
legitimacy and socially costly behavior.
17 Sherman (1993:460).
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can influence the amount of information available concerning the illegality of
acts through informational campaigns. The more the government expends
resources on such campaigns, the more knowledge there will be concerning
relevant laws, and the less need there will be for resorting to warnings. As such,
the desirability of using warnings depends, among other things, on the relative
social cost of such informational campaigns. Also, results presented in this
article are consistent with the legal rule that ignorance of the law is not a
defense. Indeed, the model assumes this rule: law enforcers are assumed to
not ask whether a person is ignorant of the law in question. This assumption
reflects the optimal approach whenever there are high costs associated with
determining a person’s level of knowledge of the law.18 This article also con-
tributes to the interpretation of the “puzzle” concerning escalating punishments
for repeat offenders.19 In particular, as demonstrated in Section 2, non-escalating
punishments can be optimal only if the use of hybrid warning strategies is
socially desirable. An immediate extension of this result is that when hybrid
warning strategies are not used (as is assumed in the existing literature so far),
escalating punishments for repeat offenders are always optimal. A last and
rather trivial implication that follows from this article is the inefficiency of ex
post facto laws. By definition, no individual has knowledge concerning an ex
post facto law at the time the offense takes place. Accordingly, there are losses
associated with the punishment of uninformed individuals, but no gains asso-
ciated with increased deterrence. Therefore, ex post facto laws are inefficient.
This article also fills in some gaps in the existing literature. Most articles in
the literature dealing with optimal punishment schemes for repeat offenders20
ignore costs associated with the punishment of the uninformed. Accordingly,
they do not generate results that provide a justification for the use of warnings in
law enforcement. On the other hand, some articles suggest that it may be
optimal not to sanction first-time offenders.21 But, not punishing offenders is
not the same thing as warning them. Warnings have an informative function,
18 On which, see Kaplow (1990).
19 Dana (2001) and Emons (2003) refer to the problem of punishing repeat offenders as a
puzzle. This is because escalating punishments are observed frequently, but there are many
models implying that this is a sub-optimal practice.
20 See note 2, supra.
21 See Harrington (1988), which deviates from the main framework for analyzing optimal
punishments for repeat offenders. An implication of this article is that warnings may be
optimal. However, this result is not due to the informational function of warnings, but due to
the design of a mechanism which allows offenders to move from one group to another where
the regulator determines the monitoring rates of each group. Accordingly, Harrington (1988)
does not highlight the informational functions of warnings as the instant article does.
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which is not focused on the existing literature. To illustrate how the instant
article builds on the existing literature, Emons (2007), Rousseau (2009), and Chu
et al. (2000) should be briefly reviewed. The former two because they are
examples of models which suggest that under various circumstances first-time
offenders should not be punished, and the latter because it incorporates costs
associated with the punishment of innocent individuals.
Emons (2007) and Rousseau (2009) conclude that, under certain circum-
stances, first-time offenders should not be sanctioned. However, these models
do not attach an informative function to warnings, and the justification of non-
punishment for first-time offenders relies on wealth constraints in Emons (2007)22
and the presence of erroneous measurements in Rousseau (2009). In Chu et al.
(2000), the authors incorporate costs associated with the punishment of innocent
individuals, but their result is not concerned with warnings. The focus is on
whether increasing penalty schemes are better than uniform ones. Furthermore,
since the article does not focus on warnings, the authors do not model the
informative function of warnings as the instant article does. It is also worth
mentioning that none of these articles attempt to model hybrid warning strategies.
Unlike optimal punishments for repeat offenders, the effect of uninformed
individuals on law enforcement is infrequently analyzed. Two exceptions are
Kaplow (1990) and Friehe (2009). Kaplow (1990) identifies optimal sanctions and
deterrence when uninformed individuals are present and conditions under
which it is efficient for tribunals to incur costs to differentiate between informed
and uninformed individuals. This article also considers individuals who have
the option of expending resources to learn about the law. The goal of Kaplow
(1990), however, is not to study warnings or the dynamic effects of sanctions
(or warnings) in terms of informing people of the illegality of a certain act.
As such, it considers a single period model that does not incorporate warnings
and, incidentally, does not make observations concerning optimal penalties for
repeat offenders. Friehe (2009), on the other hand, extends Kaplow (1990) to a
two-period setting and shows that “[e]scalating penalties can be optimal in this
setting if the uninformed overestimate the probability that their act is sanction-
able.”23 Accordingly, whereas Friehe (2009) relies on pessimistic beliefs to
provide a justification for escalating punishment schemes, this article relies on
presumptions of legality, which can be interpreted as optimism, to derive
optimal escalating punishment schemes, as well as warnings.
22 Furthermore, this conclusion requires that individuals must be constrained to choose
between always committing a crime and never committing a crime, in other words, individuals’
strategies are constrained to be history independent.
23 Friehe (2009:167).
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The next section provides a formal model, identifies optimal warning stra-
tegies, and investigates the optimality of escalating punishments for repeat
offenders. Section 3 discusses a few technical assumptions. Section 4 contains
conjectures regarding implications of the model under alternative assumptions,
and it discusses policy implications. The Appendix contains proofs for a lemma
and various propositions described in Section 2.
2 The model and analysis
Society consists of informed and uninformed individuals. Informed individuals
are aware that a certain act is illegal and know the expected sanction associated
with the commission of that act, whereas uninformed individuals are unaware of
the illegality of the same act. α denotes the proportion of uninformed individuals
in society. Individuals, regardless of their types, derive benefits (represented by
b which is positive and is distributed with density f ðbÞ) from the commission of
this act, which causes an expected harm of h to society. There are two periods.
The government possesses a detection mechanism, which catches offenders with
a probability of p,24 which is assumed to be fixed and interior (i.e. p 2 ð0; 1Þ).25 A
policy variable chosen by the government is q, the hybrid, pure, or no-warning
strategy employed by law enforcers.26 When q ¼ 0 ½q ¼ 1, all first-time
24 I assume that the government’s detection mechanism may generate the error of acquitting
guilty individuals, but not the error of convicting innocent individuals. Incorporating such
errors, which have been analyzed in the literature, e.g. by Rizzolli and Saraceno (2011) and
Mungan (2011), may provide another justification for the use of warnings, because the cost of
punishing an innocent individual presumably exceeds the cost of warning him. There is,
however, an ongoing debate as to how such errors ought to be incorporated in crime and
deterrence models (see, e.g. Garoupa and Rizzolli (2012) and Lando (2006)). I am, therefore,
excluding such potential benefits from the social welfare calculus.
25 See Section 4.1., infra, for a discussion of how an endogenous p would interact with optimal
warning strategies. See also Mungan (2010:174), arguing for the plausibility of this assumption:
“This is a commonly employed assumption in the literature. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991),
Burnovski and Safra (1994), Chu et al. (2000), Nyborg and Telle (2004), and Miceli and Bucci
(2005) are examples of models which impose this assumption. Furthermore, when general
enforcement is possible, for low levels of harm, p can be treated as a fixed value although it
is endogenously determined. The last point is formalized in Shavell (1991) …”
26 A purewarning strategy refers to issuing warnings to all first-time offenders. The meaning of the
word pure in this context is clearly distinguishable from its meaning in the context of pure strategies
in game theory, where the word indicates that a player’s likelihood of playing a given strategy is 1.
Stated differently, whereas in standard game theory the word pure refers to the likelihood of a given
strategy being played, in the present context it refers to the proportion of individuals being warned.
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offenders are warned [sanctioned]. s1 and s2, respectively, denote the endogen-
ously determined sanction imposed on first-time offenders who are not warned
and repeat offenders. A repeat offender is a person who is caught committing a
crime in the second period subsequent to being warned or sanctioned in the first
period, and a first-time offender is a person without a criminal record who is
caught committing a crime.27 It is assumed that sanctions are costless to impose
and that individuals are not wealth constrained (i.e. judgment proofness is not
an issue).28
Uninformed individuals are unaware of the illegality of the act and, accord-
ingly, do not expect to be sanctioned. Since they derive benefits from the
commission of the act, they commit it. However, once they are warned or
sanctioned, they are informed of the law and the illegality of the act.29
I assume costs associated with the punishment of the uninformed. Such
costs can only be generated through the punishment of first-time offenders,
because a person who has a criminal record must have been informed of the
illegality of his act through the imposition of a fine or warning for his first
offense. Let θ denote the number of people being punished despite being
uninformed, and let Ψðs1Þ denote the cost associated with the punishment of
an uninformed individual. Using this notation, total costs associated with the
punishment of uninformed individuals is given by θ Ψðs1Þ. In general, Ψð0Þ  0.
This reflects the fact that there may or may not be fixed costs associated with the
punishment of uninformed individuals. In Section 2, I focus on the more specific
case of Ψð0Þ > 0 and consider the implications of allowing for Ψð0Þ ¼ 0 in
Section 3.
27 Therefore, a person whose past crimes have gone unnoticed is considered a first-time
offender.
28 When individuals are wealth constrained, as discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Polinsky
and Shavell (2007)), it may be optimal to resort to non-monetary and therefore costly means of
punishing individuals. The case of costly sanctions is briefly discussed in Section 4.2.
29 Robinson and Darley (2003, 2004) argue that many individuals do not know the exact
content of the relevant criminal code. Some of these individuals may nevertheless not commit
crime. It may appear that the instant model is at odds with this observation, since uninformed
individuals are assumed to commit crime. This assumption is mainly simplifying, and one can
consider a more realistic assumption which produces the same results as in this article. In
particular, one may consider two types of uninformed individuals. The first commits crime
whereas the second refrains from committing crime when uninformed. The latter type of
individuals never commit crime and therefore need not be deterred or punished. Therefore,
they have no impact on social welfare and can legitimately be left out of the social calculus. As
such, one can proceed with the analysis as if the former and simpler assumption were true.
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I assume individuals are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers with non-
discounted additive utility over time. I use the following notation for modeling
purposes:
h > 0; harm generated by the act.
b > 0; benefit received from the commission of the act.
f ðbÞ; density function describing distribution of benefits among individuals.
f ðbÞ is positive over ½0;1Þ.
p 2 ð0; 1Þ; probability of detection.
q with 0  q  1; hybrid, pure, or no-warning strategy employed by law enfor-
cers, where q and ð1 qÞ, respectively, denote the proportion of first-time
offenders being sanctioned and warned.
s1; s2  0; finite monetary fine extracted from first-time offenders and repeat
offenders, respectively.
θðqÞ; endogenously determined proportion of society being punished despite
being uninformed.
Ψðs1Þ; with Ψðs1Þ ¼ k þ Cðs1Þ is the cost of punishing a single uninformed
individual and C0 > 0, C00  a for all s1 where both k and a are positive
constants.30
Iðq; s1Þ ¼ θðqÞΨðs1Þ; total costs associated with the punishment of uninformed
individuals. These will be called “information costs”.
To analyze optimal policy variables, I proceed by backward induction,
which requires identifying informed and uninformed individuals’ responses to
any given set of policies. Then, I derive a utilitarian social welfare function and
solve the social planner’s problem given individuals’ best responses to policy
variables.
2.1 Informed individuals’ decision making process
Informed individuals know that a certain act is a crime, and it is punishable by
law. As in Becker (1968), these individuals weigh the benefits against the
expected costs from committing a crime. When the second period is reached,
an individual only considers second period expected payoffs associated with her
30 In Section 3, I demonstrate the purpose of having C00  a. This is mainly a simplifying
assumption for expositional purposes and to ease the description of proofs. A weaker condition
which would grant the same simplifying properties is C00ðxÞ  ax . I also discuss the implications
of having k ¼ 0.
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decisions, which depend on whether she enters the second period as a first-time
or repeat offender. An immediate observation follows31:
Observation 1 (i) An informed first-time offender commits crime in the second
period iff b > qps1. (ii) A repeat offender commits crime iff b > ps2.
These inequalities govern the decisions of all informed individuals in the second
period. Individuals foresee their behavior in the second period and know that
this behavior will depend on whether or not they are caught in the first period.
Hence, their decisions in the first period can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1 Let qs1 > s2 (Case I), qs1 ¼ s2 (Case II), and qs1 < s2 (Case III) denote all
possible cases. Individuals will act in the first period under these three different
cases depending on their benefits from crime as follows:
Case I :
don’t commit the illegal act if
p
1þ p ½qs1 þ ps2  b
commit otherwise
8><
>:
Cases II and III :
don’t commit the illegal act if qps1  b
commit otherwise
(
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 1 and Observation 1, respectively, describe individuals’ first and second
period best responses to sanctions and warning strategies chosen by the govern-
ment. These best responses can be summarized by the following:
Observation 2 Let cases I–III denote the same situations as they do in Lemma 1.
Informed individuals’ behavior as a function of sanctions and warning strategies
chosen by the government are given by:
Case I
don’t commit the act in either period if b 2 0; p1þp ½qs1 þ ps2
h i
commit in 1st period and commit in if b 2 p1þp ½qs1 þ ps2; qps1

2nd period iff caught in 1st period
commit in both periods otherwise
8>>>><
>>>>:
31 I assume that indifferent individuals do not commit crime.
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Case II
don’t commit the act in either period if b 2 0; qps1½ 
commit in both periods otherwise

Case III
don’t commit the act in either period if b 2 0; qps1½ 
commit in 1st period and commit in if b 2 ðqps1; ps2
2nd period iff not caught in 1st period
commit in both periods otherwise
8>><
>>:
2.2 Uninformed individuals’ decision making process
Uninformed individuals, by definition, do not know that a certain act is a crime.
However, they are (made aware of its illegality), if they receive a warning or a
fine in the first period and become informed individuals in the second period.
Since these individuals receive benefits from committing the illegal act and do
not perceive an expected cost from engaging in that activity, they commit crime
in the first period.32 A fraction p of these individuals are caught and either
sanctioned or warned. These individuals become informed of the illegality of the
act and are deterred from committing crime for a second time if the penalty for
repeat offenders is sufficiently high. Hence, these individuals’ behavior can be
summarized by the following observation.
Observation 3 Uninformed individuals’ behavior as a function of sanctions and
warning strategies chosen by the government are given by:
Cases I; II and III
1st period commit the act
2nd Period commit the act if ps2 < b or if not detected in the first period
(
2.3 Social welfare
The utilitarian objective of the government is mitigating total net losses arising
from non-deterrence and abstaining from punishing uninformed individuals.
The latter objective is reflected through a cost function which increases in the
number of uninformed individuals being sanctioned and the severity of sanc-
tions imposed on them:
32 This is true even for uninformed individuals whose actual net expected benefits are negative.
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Iðq; s1Þ ¼ θðqÞΨðs1Þ ¼ θðqÞ½k þ Cðs1Þ ð1Þ
The first objective is reflected through net aggregate benefits from crime.
This is described by:
ð
O1ðs1;s2 ;qÞ
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ
ð
O2ðs1;s2;qÞ
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb ð2Þ
where O1 and O2 denote the set of offenders in the first and second periods,
which depend on policy variables chosen by the government and determined via
Observations 2 and 3.
Hence, the objective of the government is to maximize:
ð
O1ðs1;s2;qÞ
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ
ð
O2ðs1;s2 ;qÞ
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb θðqÞ½k þ Cðs1Þ ð3Þ
Note that θðqÞ, the number of uninformed individuals being sanctioned, is a
constant multiplied by q. To see this, observe that in the first period all unin-
formed individuals commit crime and p of them are caught. In the second
period, ð1 pÞ of them are still uninformed and commit crime, and a p fraction
of these individuals are caught. However, only a q proportion of these indivi-
duals are sanctioned. Therefore, qð2 pÞp is the proportion of uninformed
individuals being sanctioned which implies that:
θðqÞ ¼ qð2 pÞpα ð4Þ
Hence, eq. (3) becomes
W ¼
ð
O1ðs1;s2 ;qÞ
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ
ð
O2ðs1;s2;qÞ
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb qð2 pÞpα½k þ Cðs1Þ
ð5Þ
2.4 Optimality
Maximizing W requires choosing a sanction pair ðs1; s2Þ and q. It should first be
noted that information costs, namely Iðq; s1Þ ¼ θ½k þ Cðs1Þ, do not depend on the
choice of second period sanctions. Having made this observation, one can deter-
mine the optimal sanctions ðs1 and s2Þ and the optimal warning strategy ðqÞ in
two steps. Let S denote the expected sanction for first-time offenders ðqps1Þ. One
can first answer the following question: Given any targeted level of S, how can one
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minimize informational costs ðIðq; s1ÞÞ? The answer to this question will provide
us with the policy variables q and s1, which minimize informational costs given
any S. After these are determined as a function of S, one can go into the second
step of the analysis and find the optimal level of expected sanctions for first-time
offenders ðSÞ and repeat offenders ðps2Þ. Once optimal expected sanctions for
first-time and repeat offenders are determined, one can easily determine optimal
policy variables s1 and q
 by finding the information cost-minimizing s1 and q
when the targeted expected sanction is S by using the results obtained in step
one. Following this two-step approach, the next sub-section identifies policy
variables minimizing informational costs given any level of S.
2.4.1 Information cost minimization
Informational costs are given by:
Iðq; s1Þ ¼ θðqÞΨðs1Þ ¼ qð2 pÞpα½k þ Cðs1Þ ð6Þ
The objective in this sub-section is to minimize these costs, given any
expected sanction for first-time offenders ðS ¼ qps1Þ. This problem can conve-
niently be summarized as:
min
q;s1
θðqÞΨðs1Þ such that S ¼ pqs1; s1  0 and 0  q  1 ð7Þ
The following proposition summarizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 1: There exists S such that (i) to achieve an expected first period sanction
Sh  S, the information cost-minimizing strategy is to impose no warnings ðqm ¼ 1Þ
along with a sanction of sm1 ¼ Shp . (ii) To achieve an expected first period sanction Sl
such that 0 < Sl < S, the information cost-minimizing strategy is to impose a hybrid
strategy for warnings ð0 < qm < 1Þ along with a sanction of sm1 ¼ Slpqm . (iii) To achieve
an expected sanction of zero, the information cost-minimizing strategy is pure warnings
ðqm ¼ 0Þ. In this case, first-time offenders are never sanctioned, and therefore, the
particular choice of s1 does not affect I.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that if the desired level of expected sanctions for first-time
offenders is high, then warnings should not be employed. On the other extreme,
if the desired expected sanction is zero, first-time offenders should always be
warned. These results are rather intuitive. What is perhaps less intuitive is the
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result concerning hybrid warning strategies; hybrid warning strategies are desir-
able if intermediate or low expected sanctions are targeted. Although these
results lead one to conjecture that qm, the information cost-minimizing warning
strategy, is increasing in the targeted expected sanction, they do not allow us to
reach this conclusion. The next proposition verifies this conjecture and deter-
mines the precise relation between the targeted expected sanction and the
information cost-minimizing policy variables.
Proposition 2: (i) For all S < S, the information cost-minimizing warning strategy
ðqmÞ is linearly increasing in S, with qm ¼ SS and (ii) for all positive S < S, the
information cost-minimizing sanction ðsm1 Þ for first-time offenders is a constant.
Proof: See Appendix.
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the results obtained in Propositions 1 and 2.
SS
s
0,0
s1
m(S)S/p
Figure 2: Information cost-minimizing sanctions
SS
q
0,0
qm(S)
1
Figure 1: Information cost-minimizing warnings
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Propositions 1 and 2 provide key results that are frequently exploited in the
proceeding parts. Accordingly, it is worth briefly describing the economic intuition
behind them. Informational costs are given by qð2 pÞpα½k þ Cðs1Þ. Since
ð2 pÞpα is a constant, we may represent it with a letter, say A. Moreover, given
the first constraint on theminimization problem, namely S ¼ qps1, q can be replaced
with S=ps1 to discuss results. In this case, AS kps1 and AS
Cðs1Þ
ps1
, respectively, represent
the aggregate fixed and variable costs of punishing uninformed individuals. It is now
easy to see that the aggregate fixed cost component ðAS kps1Þ is decreasing in s1. This is
because aggregate fixed costs only depend on the number of individuals being
punished, and greater sanctions allow the targeted expected sanction (i.e. S) to be
met by punishing fewer uninformed individuals. The aggregate variable cost com-
ponent (AS Cðs1Þps1 ), on the other hand, is increasing in s1. This is because the convexity
of Cð:Þ guarantees that the per person information cost (i.e. Cðs1Þ) is increasing faster
than the number of punished uninformed individuals decreases (i.e. ASps1 ). As such,
there is a cost component that is increasing in and another one that is decreasing in
s1. Thus, the information cost-minimizing s1 equates the marginal aggregate fixed
cost to the marginal aggregate variable cost. This occurs at some s^1, which does not
depend on A or S, since both of these values scale marginal variable and marginal
fixed costs by the same number. q, on the other hand, is chosen such that q ¼ Sps^1 .
This simple analysis, however, ignores the second constraint, namely,
0  q  1. If the targeted expected sanction is very large and s ¼ s^1, then even
when warnings are never used (i.e. q ¼ 1) the targeted expected sanction of S
cannot be achieved. In these cases, s1 cannot be chosen to equate marginal
aggregate fixed and variable costs of punishing uninformed individuals. In
particular, s1 must exceed s^1, and the marginal aggregate variable cost must
exceed the marginal aggregate fixed cost of punishing uninformed individuals.
In such cases, it is cost-minimizing to go for the solution that minimizes the
difference between these two marginal costs. This occurs when s1 is chosen as
small as possible, which occurs when q ¼ 1 and s1 ¼ Sp .
Due to these reasons, as stated in Proposition 2, when the targeted expected
sanction is small, s1 is chosen at its ideal level of s^1, and q is chosen to make
sure the targeted level of expected sanction is met. If, however, the targeted
expected sanction is too large, it is not possible to set s1 ¼ s^1, since one cannot
simultaneously achieve the targeted expected sanction of S and have q  1. In
these cases, it is optimal to set q ¼ 1 and s1 ¼ Sp to minimize the difference
between the marginal aggregate variable cost and the marginal aggregate fixed
cost of punishing uninformed individuals.
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2.4.2 Optimal policy variables
To determine optimal policy variables, the optimal expected sanction for first-
time offenders must be determined. In turn, this will allow the identification of
optimal warning strategies and sanctions for first-time offenders. However, there
is a third policy variable that must be chosen, namely s2, the sanction for repeat
offenders. But, since s2 does not affect information costs, its determination is
relatively straightforward. The next proposition identifies the optimal sanction
for repeat offenders and a range for optimal expected sanctions for first-time
offenders.33
Proposition 3: The optimal sanction and warning strategy result in under-deter-
rence for first-time offenders and first-best deterrence for repeat offenders. This is
achieved by a sanction pair ðs1 ; s2Þ and warning strategy q such that s1 < hqp and
s2 ¼ hp .
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 verifies a claim extended in Section 1: the expected punishment for
first-time offenders must be chosen to balance costs associated with under-
deterrence and the punishment of uninformed individuals, whereas the
expected punishment for repeat offenders must be chosen to induce first-best
deterrence. This follows from the fact that all repeat offenders are informed
individuals, but there are some first-time offenders who are uninformed.
Accordingly, high expected sanctions for first-time offenders generate costs
associated with the punishment of uninformed individuals, but the same is
not true for expected sanctions for repeat offenders. The following corollary
highlights this result.
Corollary 1: Increasing expected sanctions for repeat offenders are optimal
(i.e. s1q
p < s2p).
There is a broad literature on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders.34 The
main debate is centered on the economic rationale as to why repeat offenders
should be punished more severely. Corollary 1 points out that under the
33 This proposition assumes α > 0. When α ¼ 0, the optimal first period sanctions and warning
strategies are such that s1 ¼ hqp .
34 See note 2, supra.
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assumptions of this model, it is always optimal to subject repeat offenders to
higher expected sanctions. The optimality of increasing actual sanctions (s1 and
s2 ) depends on what type of warning strategies are optimal and the harm
associated with the offense. Therefore, the identification of conditions for opti-
mal increasing sanctions is delayed until after the determination of optimal
warning strategies.
To proceed, note that since s2 is pinned down (by Proposition 3) and the
information cost minimization problem is solved (by Propositions 1 and 2), one
can easily express the maximum value for social welfare, denoted as V, as a
function only of the expected sanction for first-time offenders:
VðSÞ ¼ K þ ð2 pÞð1 αÞ
ðh
S
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb IðSÞ ð8Þ
where IðSÞ denotes informational costs evaluated when q and s1 are chosen to
minimize such costs and K is simply a constant term capturing benefits/losses of
crimes committed by uninformed individuals and repeat offenders.35 In the
remaining parts of the article, it will be assumed that V is concave in S. All
that remains is the maximization of V with respect to expected sanctions for
first-time offenders. Once this is accomplished, optimal warning strategies can
be determined by making use of Propositions 1 and 2. The next proposition
summarizes results obtained once these steps are followed.36
Proposition 4: (i) The optimal expected sanction for first-time offenders is given by:
S ¼ 0 if h 
αp
S kþCð
S
pÞ
 
ð1αÞf ð0Þ ; h
0ðαÞ
ð1 αÞðh SÞf ðSÞ ¼ pα 1S k þ CðSpÞ
 
if h0ðαÞ;
αp
S kþCð
S
pÞ
 
ð1αÞ _f ð0Þ < h < Sþ
αp
S kþCð
S
pÞ
 
ð1αÞf ðSÞ ; h
00ðαÞ
ð1 αÞðh SÞf ðSÞ ¼ αC0ðSpÞ if h00ðαÞ ; Sþ
αp
S kþCð
S
pÞ
 
ð1αÞf ðSÞ  h
(ii) For all α, (1) for crimes resulting in harm h  h0 the optimal warning
strategy is pure warnings (q ¼ 0), (2) for crimes resulting in harm h with
h0 < h < h00 the optimal warning strategy is hybrid warnings ð0 < q < 1Þ, where
35 For the explicit expression for K and a brief explanation of the derivation of VðSÞ, see the
proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
36 This proposition reports results when α > 0. When α ¼ 0 any warning strategy accompanied
by proper sanctions for first-time offenders is optimal. However, for expositional convenience,
critical values h0 and h00 in Proposition 4 and Figure 3 are reported as functions with domain ½0; 1.
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q is increasing in h, and (3) for crimes resulting in harm h  h00 the optimal
warning strategy is no-warning (q ¼ 1). (4) h0ðαÞ and h00 αð Þ are both convex and
increasing in α, approach infinity as α approaches 1, and h0ð0Þ ¼ 0 and h00ð0Þ ¼ S.
Proof: See Appendix.
As described in Proposition 4, the optimal warning strategy is a function of the
proportion of uninformed individuals and the harm associated with crime. Using
this proposition, one can plot the optimal warning strategies in h α space, as is
shown in Figure 3.
Further interpretation of Proposition 4 and Figure 3 is provided in Section 4.
However, an implication of Propositions 3 and 4 related to the optimal punish-
ment of repeat offenders can be summarized by the following result.
Proposition 5: Escalating penalties for repeat offenders are optimal (i.e. s2 > s

1 ),
unless (i) the harm associated with the offense is sufficiently low (i.e. h  S) and
(ii) hybrid warning strategies are optimal ð0 < q < 1Þ.
Proof: See Appendix.
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Figure 3: Optimal warning strategies as a function of harm and proportion of uninformed
individuals
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Proposition 5 contributes to the interpretation of the escalating punishments
puzzle37 by identifying conditions (highlighted in Figure 3) under which this
practice is optimal. It states that escalating punishments are usually optimal and
that a necessary condition for their non-optimality is the possibility of imposing
hybrid warning strategies. This leads to the conjecture that in standard settings,
where some individuals are uninformed and warnings are not possible, increas-
ing punishments for repeat offenders are always optimal. In other words, if the
current model was constrained such that q ¼ 1 always holds, escalating punish-
ments would always be optimal.
3 Discussion of assumptions
3.1 Multiplicative structure
The multiplicative nature of the information cost function is a product of
utilitarianism. I ¼ θ½k þ C simply states that costs are equal to the sum of per
individual costs times the number of individuals incurring or producing such
costs. Accordingly, I believe that this particular form is justifiable on utilitarian
grounds. The more problematic assumptions are associated with the specific
functional form of C and there being fixed costs associated with the sanctioning
of uninformed individuals.
3.2 k > 0
This assumption simply states that once individuals are punished despite being
uninformed, costs are incurred, which are independent of the severity of the
punishment. This can be related to the creation of distrust among individuals
toward the legal system or simply a feeling of being wronged which may trigger
an adverse feeling toward law enforcement in general. Such costs have been
identified in the criminology literature and are discussed to some extent in
Section 1.
It may be argued that in the special case where s1 ¼ 0 and q > 0, the
functional form makes no sense. In this case, some individuals are not warned,
but not sanctioned either (since s1 ¼ 0). I will not discuss whether 0-sanctions
can trigger a feeling of being wronged or whether they would create distrust.
37 See note 19, supra.
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I will instead point out the fact that in this model, this case is never observed in
the optimal solution, hence, the question of whether there should be costs in
this special case is moot.
If one believes that 0-sanctions do not create costs, an alternative reaction
might be to alter the structure of informational costs so that Iðq; s1Þ ¼ 0 when-
ever q ¼ 0 or s1 ¼ 0. This would not alter any of the main results. To see this,
note that the proposed alteration on information costs has no effect on costs
when both s1 and q are positive. Hence, the alteration has no effect on informa-
tion cost-minimizing strategies when the targeted S is positive, because this
requires that s1 > 0 and q > 0. This implies that IðSÞ, and therefore VðSÞ,
remains the same when S > 0. Next, note that when the targeted S is zero, the
alteration implies that information costs are minimized when q ¼ 0 or s1 ¼ 0, in
which case I ¼ 0, as in the model in Section 2. Hence, VðSÞ is unaffected by the
proposed alteration on Iðq; s1Þ and is therefore maximized by the same choices
of S. This implies that optimal warning strategies and sanctions are unaffected
by the alteration when h > h0. The optimal strategy when h  h0, however, is to
have either q ¼ 0 or s1 ¼ 0 as opposed to q ¼ 0. Hence, the only effect of the
alteration is that when h  h0, it is optimal not only to use pure warning
strategies, but also to use zero-sanctions for first-time offenders.
Having identified the reasons as to why I think this assumption is justifiable,
I will comment on what the model implies when k ¼ 0. When k ¼ 0, information
costs are minimized whenever q ¼ 1, because informational costs are always
decreasing in q (see proof of Proposition 1 and set k ¼ 0). Hence, no-warning
would always be optimal. From a positive stand point, the inconsistency of this
result with what is observed in reality is perhaps another reason as to why k > 0
is a plausible assumption.
3.3 C00  a > 0
This assumption basically states that costs are always accelerating with the
severity of punishment, at or above a certain rate. Admittedly, it is not an
intuitive assumption. I would note, however, that this is not a necessary condi-
tion. It is rather a sufficient condition which is used to ease the exposition and
derivation of results. The purpose of this assumption is to guarantee the exis-
tence of the critical expected sanction ðSÞ which is referred to in a few proposi-
tions. In the model’s current form, for any S > S, variable costs (qCð SpqÞ) decrease
faster than fixed costs (kq) increase, in response to an increase in q, regardless of
the choice of q. Hence, for such S, it is optimal to choose q ¼ 1, which minimizes
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C but maximizes kq. I believe that it is plausible to assume that such a critical
level exists. Otherwise, it would follow that no-warnings can never be optimal
even in cases such as murder, where presumably most individuals are informed
of the law.
A weaker sufficient condition would be C00ðxÞ  ax for some positive a.
However, this assumption is no more intuitive than the assumption used and
requires slightly more complicated notation.
4 Further discussion
Next, I discuss several issues which are frequently discussed in the law enforce-
ment literature, including the exogeneity versus endogeneity of the probability
of detection (p),38 costly sanctions,39 the use of discretion,40 and escalating
punishment schemes.41 I also provide some empirical motivation for the theory
presented by discussing warnings in the context of real-world observations and
how the use of warnings may evolve over time.
4.1 Interaction between warnings and the probability
of detection
In Section 2, I assumed that the probability of detection (p) is exogenously
determined. As such, the model presented does not capture potential interac-
tions between p and q. One may, therefore, object to the main findings by
reasoning that the exogeneity of p drives results. This criticism may take the
following form. Optimality conditions suggest that law enforcers catch indivi-
duals committing an offense and release ð1 qÞ proportion of first-time offen-
ders committing that offense. This, or a similar result, can be achieved by
decreasing the probability of detection (p). Decreasing p is equivalent to punish-
ing fewer uninformed individuals, which is the main function of warnings. In
other words, we are using too big of a net to catch fish and are subsequently
38 See, e.g. Polinsky and Shavell (2007:413–414) showing that in the simple law enforcement
model under-deterrence is optimal when p is endogenous, whereas it is not when p is
exogenous.
39 See, e.g. Polinsky and Shavell (2007, sections 4–9).
40 See, e.g. Shavell (2007).
41 See note 2, supra.
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releasing some of the fish caught. We can instead start with a smaller net. When
p is fixed, this possibility cannot be captured by the model, and one cannot
confidently claim that warnings are optimal (even if they appear to be optimal in
the instant model).
This criticism is best addressed by considering the functional differences
between the two policy tools in question (i.e. warnings and the probability of
detection). Decreasing the probability of detection (p) as well as increasing the
proportion of individuals being warned (1 q) reduces deterrence. Reducing p
leads to a lower threat of punishment for first-time offenders as well as repeat
offenders, whereas decreasing q has an adverse effect on the deterrence of first-
time offenders only. More importantly, p affects the number of informed indivi-
duals in future periods, but q does not. When p is increased, more uninformed
individuals are sanctioned or warned in the first period, which converts them
into informed individuals in the second period. Warnings, on the other hand, do
not produce a similar effect, since information can be disseminated through
sanctions as well as warnings. As such, an increase in the rate of warnings is
superior to a reduction in the probability of detection as a tool for decreasing the
number of uninformed individuals being punished.
This idea can be formalized relatively simply by considering the direct
welfare effects of the probability of detection and the proportion of individuals
being warned. To do this, I initially assume away enforcement costs (i.e. the
physical cost of increasing p as described, for instance, in Polinsky and Shavell
(2000)) and focus on costs of punishing uninformed individuals and costs of
under-deterrence. As eq. (8) and the proof of Proposition 3 suggest, social
welfare can be expressed as:
VðSÞ ¼ ð1 αÞ 2
ð1
h
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ ð2 pÞ
ðh
S
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb
	 
þ α 2
ð1
h
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ ð2 pÞ
ðh
0
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb
	 
ð2 pÞpqα½k þ Cðs1Þ
ð9Þ
and recall that S ¼ ps1q.
Given any pl < 1, let the optimal policy choices (as derived in the previous
sections) be denoted by s1 ; s

2 ; and q
. Now consider increasing the probability of
detection from pl to ph > pl and decreasing q to p
l
ph q
. This change results in an
increase in the first term in eq. (9), since the change leaves S unaffected and leads
to a reduction in ð2 pÞ, the measure of informed individuals being undeterred. A
similar positive effect associated with the number of under-deterred and (initially)
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uninformed individuals is captured through the second term. Furthermore, since
the change preserves pq and s1 , the aggregate cost of punishing uninformed
individuals (captured through the third term in eq. (9)) is also reduced.
This simple observation shows that an increase in p necessarily leads to
welfare increases. As such, absent enforcement costs, it would be optimal to
have a probability of detection of 1 and a high rate of warnings. In other words,
if big nets did not cost anything, we would prefer to have the biggest one
possible. When there are enforcement costs, the optimal p will depend on the
trade-off between these identified costs and benefits and the specific functional
form of each. The existence of enforcement costs, however, should not alter the
conclusion that a reduction in the probability of detection and an increase in the
rate of warnings are not functional equivalents and that the optimality of
warnings is not a simple product of assuming an exogenous probability of
detection.
4.2 Costly sanctions
The model presented in Section 2 assumes that it is costless to impose sanctions.
This assumption, as discussed in the existing literature,42 is less problematic
when monetary sanctions can be used to generate a sufficient threat of punish-
ment. When monetary sanctions are inadequate to deter undesirable conduct,
more costly modes of punishment, such as imprisonment, may become neces-
sary. An intuitive conjecture can be made regarding the likely effects of incor-
porating imprisonment into the model presented in Section 2. Major deviations
from results presented in Section 2 are unexpected when imprisonment is
required to deter high-harm crimes and imprisonment costs rise proportionally
with the expected non-monetary sanction (i.e. S ¼ qps1).
To see this, note that, as can be seen from eq. (8), increasing S leads to
benefits by reducing under-deterrence and costs by increasing informational
costs. When imprisonment costs are present, a third component of welfare
emerges that consists of costs increasing in S. This implies that the larger
imprisonment costs are in relation to gains from deterrence, the lower S that
ought to be chosen. As such, the presence of imprisonment costs implies that,
ceteris paribus, smaller S’s be chosen. Next, it should be noted that the optimal
q–s1 pair as a function of S is not altered by the incorporation of imprisonment
costs. This follows, because imprisonment costs are assumed to be a function of
S (i.e. the product of q and s1) and do not depend on the specific q–s1 pairs
42 See, e.g. Polinsky and Shavell (1984).
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which generate the same S (i.e. imprisonment costs are the same for all q and s1
such that pqs1 ¼ S). Therefore, the inclusion of imprisonment costs only affects
the optimal S, but does not affect the cost-minimizing q s1 pair given the
targeted S.
These observations imply that the incorporation of imprisonment costs is
not expected to significantly alter results, but it is likely to lead to some
quantitative changes. In particular, for any given h and α, the inclusion of
imprisonment costs is likely to push the optimal S downward. As such, h0 and
h00, as plotted in Figure 3, are likely to shift toward the northwest direction. But
since the cost-minimizing q s1 pairs given optimal S’s are unaltered, no-warn-
ing strategies remain optimal to the north of the shifted h00 curve, hybrid
warnings remain optimal between the shifted h0 and h00 curves, and pure warn-
ings remain optimal to the south of the shifted h0 curve. This implies that pure
warnings and hybrid warnings ought to be used more often compared to the
case where imprisonment costs are absent.
4.3 Consistency of results
Figure 3 describes optimal warning strategies as a function of the proportion of
informed individuals and the level of harm associated with the offense. One can
assign certain offenses on this graph to see whether results obtained are con-
sistent with warning strategies employed by law enforcers in reality.
Assigning extreme offenses, such as murder, on the graph is relatively easy.
Almost all individuals are informed of the illegality of the crime and harms
associated with the crime are very high. Hence, murder would go on the north-
west portion of the graph. This suggests that the optimal warning strategy is no-
warning, which is consistent with the warning strategies employed in reality.
On the other hand, making an illegal U-turn or illegally switching lanes are
associated with lower levels of expected harm. Assuming that expected harms
from these offenses fall below the threshold level of S is sufficient to suggest that
some type of warnings (pure or hybrid) should be employed for these offenses.
Furthermore, in certain cases (e.g. when signs are not posted properly or the
lanes are not drawn properly), the proportion of individuals who are informed of
the law may also be quite low. This implies that these offenses go into the
southeast corner of the graph, which suggests pure warnings are optimal.
For intermediate offenses, such as speeding and reckless driving, the opti-
mal warning strategy may depend on the severity of the offense. For instance,
driving 100 m.p.h. in a residential area is presumably associated with high
expected harms, and most individuals are likely to guess that such an act is
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illegal. In this case, it will be optimal to employ a no-warning strategy. On the
other hand, on a country road between two states, individuals may lack infor-
mation about the speed limits and may have different presumptions. In this
case, if the harm associated with this act is sufficiently small, hybrid strategies
might be optimal.
There are interesting examples of low-harm/low-information offenses
(southeast corner of the graph), which have been enforced through (informal)
warnings. Disposing of cigarette butts on streets have been recently illegalized
in Turkey, and this act was declared to be a sanctionable offense. The law,
however, was not publicized very successfully and was contrary to people’s
expectations. Law enforcers commonly resorted to informal warnings until
citizens became aware of the illegality of disposing cigarette butts.
A separate and rather trivial implication of the model is that ex post facto
laws should never be passed. The proportion of individuals, who have knowl-
edge of an ex post facto law, at the time of the commission of the offense, is by
definition 0. This implies that α ¼ 1, which suggests that no individual should
be sanctioned.
Overall, results presented appear to be consistent with warning strategies
employed in reality. If there are offenses which are outliers, it may be an
interesting task to see if these offenses have some rare properties which are
not captured in this article. One can then study these properties which may
allow us to make observations concerning their impact on social welfare.
Consistency of results with actual warning practices for well-known offenses
(murder, rape, speeding, and other traffic violations) suggests that we, as a
society, may in fact be maximizing an objective function which is similar to that
suggested in this article. More specifically, we may have a shared intuition
that it is costly to punish uninformed individuals and that these costs
have the properties described in the preceding parts: there is a fixed cost to
punishing an uninformed individual, and such costs are increasing at an
increasing rate.
4.4 Policy implications in a dynamic setting
Although the model considers two periods, it is static in the sense that it does
not consider changes in parameters, such as α, over time. Accordingly, it
abstracts from issues such as the level of information varying across time and
policies. Nevertheless, results obtained through this static model allow us to
draw inferences regarding the effects of various policies in a more dynamic
setting.
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Presumably, the level of information in society will be low for laws which
have been recently passed. Accordingly, one can think of new laws as being
associated with a high level of α. As time goes by, and the law gets older, a
higher proportion of society familiarizes itself with the law due to information
dissemination. Hence, the proportion of uninformed individuals ðαÞ decreases as
the law ages. This observation leads to the conjecture that, ceteris paribus, newly
introduced laws should make use of warnings often; in other words, they ought
to be enforced via low-q warning strategies. And as time goes by, and α
decreases, warnings should be relied on less heavily. That is to say, law
enforcers should move from low-q warning strategies to high-q warning strate-
gies as the law gets older.
There can, however, be exceptions. Consider the case where a technological
advance makes it possible for individuals to engage in highly harmful conduct,
which is not yet illegal (in this regard, one can consider the use of internet for
copyright infringement purposes). The policy recommendation of the instant
model would be passing a law illegalizing such conduct and enforcing it without
resorting to warnings at all or use high-q warning strategies (in this regard, one
can consider the Digital Millennium Copyright Act being implemented strictly).
A simple corollary is observed when the availability of informational cam-
paigns is considered. Politicians and legislators can reduce α, the proportion of
uninformed individuals, through informational campaigns via social media (e.g.
through ads on TV, billboards and online social platforms such as Facebook,
and warning trailers on DVDs43). Although α is assumed to be exogenous in the
main sections of this article, the consequences and optimality of such cam-
paigns can be studied by extending the model presented earlier.
It is optimal to rely on warnings less often when informational campaigns
are used more often, because such campaigns reduce the proportion of unin-
formed individuals, and therefore, the marginal benefit from using warnings.44
But, whether or not it is desirable to use informational campaigns in the first
place depends completely on the relative cost of such campaigns. If the marginal
cost of decreasing α through informational campaigns is high in comparison
to the increase in social welfare due to a lower proportion of uninformed
individuals in society, then it is optimal to not use informational campaigns.
43 Consider, for instance, the following language, which is often used by the FBI to inform
people of the consequences of copyright infringements: “The unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of this copyrighted work is illegal. Criminal copyright infringement, including
infringement without monetary gain, is investigated by the FBI and is punishable by up to 5
years in federal prison and a fine of $250,000.”
44 This is a direct implication of Proposition 4, which suggests that the optimal q is weakly
decreasing in α.
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To formalize this point, let u denote informational campaign expenses.
Then, α ¼ αðuÞ and α0 < 0. The maximum value of social welfare can now be
expressed as:
ZðuÞ ¼ max
S
VðS; αðuÞÞ  u ; YðαðuÞÞ  u ð10Þ
where V is as defined in eq. (8). If Y 0α0 < 1, then it is optimal to not have
informational campaigns. Otherwise, incurring some informational campaign
expenses is optimal, and the optimal u depends on the trade-off between direct
campaign costs and the marginal increase in max
S
VðS; αðuÞÞ due to an increase
in u.
4.5 Discretion
Police officers often use discretion in issuing warnings as opposed to sanctions.
There may be problems associated with giving police officers discretion, such as
increased opportunities for framing and bribery. Presumably, when police offi-
cers are acting honestly, on average they make correct rather than wrong
guesses in determining whether or not an offender was informed of the law.
Hence, as long as there are some potentially corruptible police officers, there are
costs and benefits associated with the use of discretion by police officers, and
without further investigation it is not clear whether police discretion should be
allowed.45
This article derives optimal warning strategies, at the absence of discretion-
ary behavior. But the implications of the model can aid in determining optimal
discretion policies in two ways. First, implementing hybrid warning strategies,
without resorting to discretion, increases the benefits associated with a no-
discretion regime. In a regular law enforcement framework, one would consider
the non-discretionary framework as consisting of no-warning or pure warning
regimes. However, hybrid warning strategies can be implemented without
resorting to discretion.46 This increases the maximum welfare achievable in a
non-discretionary regime, since the use of hybrid warnings is optimal for crimes
with h 2 ðh0; h00Þ. As such, there may be instances in which a non-discretionary
regime dominates all discretionary regimes when the availability of hybrid
45 See Shavell (2007), for an extensive analysis as to when and how discretion should be
allowed.
46 For instance by requiring police officers to issue warnings x% of the time and in a particular
order.
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warnings is considered, but is dominated by a discretionary regime when only
no-warning and pure warning strategies are considered.
Second, welfare can be increased by providing police officers with instruc-
tions to issue warnings a certain proportion of the time when they are not
confident about their assessments concerning the suspects’ guilt. If a police
officer cares only about his self-interest, such guidelines will not affect his
behavior; he will simply do what is in his best interest. However, when he is
acting honestly, there will be cases in which he is not confident about his guess
regarding the innocence of an individual. In these cases, discretionary behavior
can be supplemented by the use of warnings as suggested in this article, which
should lead to an increase in social welfare.
4.6 Escalating punishment schemes
Determining how repeat offenders ought to be punished has been regarded
as a puzzling task in the existing literature.47 This is mainly because many
models48 imply results that are contrary to our intuition that repeat offenders
ought to be punished more severely. Although the instant article was mainly
concerned with optimal warning strategies in law enforcement, it also contri-
butes to the literature on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders in several
ways.
In general, my results overlap with the intuitive conjecture that repeat
offenders ought to be punished more severely. These results are summarized
by corollary 1 and Proposition 5 and are briefly interpreted in Section 4. The
driving assumption behind these results is that there are uninformed indivi-
duals, and their punishment is costly. Repeat offenders are by definition
informed individuals, since they were informed of the act’s illegality when
they were previously caught. On the other hand, a proportion of first-time
offenders are uninformed individuals. Hence, repeat offenders can be subjected
to sanctions which result in first-best deterrence. On the contrary, such punish-
ments would be undesirably high for first-time offenders due to costs associated
with the punishment of uninformed individuals. Therefore, under many condi-
tions, escalating punishments are optimal.
This observation demonstrates one of the reasons as to why we may be
confronted with a puzzle in the repeat offender literature. We are abstracting
47 See note 19, supra.
48 Emons (2003, 2004, 2007) are examples of such models.
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from issues related to lack of knowledge concerning laws and the existence of
mistakes.49 This leads to a second implication, which is related to the optimal
increase in the punishment of repeat offenders. If lack of information is (at least
partially) responsible for escalating punishments for repeat offenders, then the
increase in punishment should be related to how little information there is con-
cerning a law. In particular, ceteris paribus, the more uninformed individuals in
society, the greater the increase in the punishment for repeat offenders should be.
In sum, incorporating informational problems in repeat offender models will
likely produce results that are consistent with our intuition that repeat offenders
should be punished more severely. Furthermore, such inclusion is likely to
provide general guidelines as to how punishments for repeat offenders should
be increased.
5 Concluding remarks
This article attempts to provide a simple framework that allows the incorpora-
tion of the informative function of warnings. It captures the trade-off between
costs of punishing uninformed individuals and reduced levels of deterrence and
identifies sufficient conditions under which using warnings is optimal.
Assuming these sufficient conditions hold, it discusses issues related to the
use of discretion, evolution of optimal warning strategies over time, and the
use of warnings in real-life situations. This article also adds to the existing
literature on optimal punishments for repeat offenders by identifying conditions
under which escalating punishments are optimal.
Existing literature on law enforcement does not provide satisfying rationales
for the use of warnings that are based on their informational value. This article
highlights that such rationales emerge when one considers social costs
associated with the punishment of uninformed individuals. One may be reluc-
tant to incorporate such costs into law enforcement models on grounds that they
appear to be ad hoc. But if people react to legal procedures (and, therefore,
generate social costs) in a seemingly ad hoc manner, then incorporating
such social costs might be the only way to capture the rationale behind why
warnings and other puzzling methods are observed in the enforcement of
laws.
49 See also Mungan (2012), reviewing the existing literature and pointing out that the assump-
tion of fixed, rather than fluctuating, criminal tendencies may be responsible for the failure of
many models to generate results that are consistent with our intuitions of justice.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: One can define the second period payoffs of informed
individuals who have been detected and those who have not been detected in
the first period, respectively, as follows:
d2 ¼ maxfb ps2;0g and n2 ¼ maxfb qps1;0g ð11Þ
Hence, an informed individual’s expected utility from committing crime in
the first period is
UC ¼ ½b qps1 þ ½pd2 þ ð1 pÞ n2  ð12Þ
and an informed individual’s expected utility from not committing crime in the
first period is
UL ¼ n2 ð13Þ
Now let  ¼ maxfps2; qps1g and  ¼ minfps2; qps1g.
b >  implies that d2 > 0 and 
n
2 > 0, therefore
UL ¼ n2 ¼ ½b qps1 < ½b qps1 þ ½pd2 þ ð1 pÞ n2  ¼ UC whenever b > 
ð14Þ
Hence, when b >  individuals will commit the crime in the first period.
b   implies that d2 ¼ 0, n2 ¼ 0 and ½b qps1  0; therefore
UL ¼ n2 ¼ 0  ½b qps1 þ ½pd2 þ ð1 pÞ n2  ¼ UC whenever b   ð15Þ
Hence, when b   individuals will not commit crime in the first period.
Now it is only necessary to check the behavior of informed individuals when
s1 and s2 are chosen such that  < b  .
In Case II,  ¼ , therefore we already have the requested result for this
case, namely that individuals will commit crime only if b > qps1 ¼ ps2.
In Case I, informed individuals with benefits such that ps2 < b  qps1 will
commit crime in the second period only if they are caught in the first one.
Hence, if the relation below holds, informed individuals will commit crime.
UC ¼ ½b qps1 þ ½pðb ps2Þ > 0 ¼ UL ð16Þ
Therefore, informed individuals will commit crime in the first period if
b >
p
1þ p ½qs1 þ ps2 ¼ b
 ð17Þ
Note that ps2 < b  qps1.
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In Case III, individuals with benefits such that qps1 < b  ps2 will commit
crime in the second period only if they are not caught in the first period. Hence,
if the relation below holds, informed individuals will commit crime.
UC ¼ ½b qps1 þ ½ð1 pÞðb qps1Þ > b qps1 ¼ UL ð18Þ
Hence, individuals commit crime in the first period if b > qps1. ■
Proof of Proposition 1:
Part (iii): S ¼ 0 requires either s1 ¼ 0, q ¼ 0 or both. To prove the claim, it is
sufficient to note that for any q0 > 0, it follows that Iðq0;0Þ ¼ q0ð2 pÞpαk > 0 ¼
Ið0; s01Þ for all s01.
Parts (i) and (ii): Consider the following constrained minimization problem:
min
q;s1
Iðq; s1Þ such that S ¼ pqs1; s1  0 and 0 < q  1 ð19Þ
The solution to this problem describes the optimal policy variables to achieve a
given level of expected sanctions for first-time offenders. An equivalent and
more convenient formulation of the same problem, utilizing eq. (4), is
min
q2ð0;1
qð2 pÞpα k þ C S
pq
 
	 
; min
q2ð0;1
Ωðq; SÞ ð20Þ
Differentiating Ωðq; SÞ with respect to q results in the following F.O.C.:
Ωqðq; SÞ ¼ ð2 pÞpα k þ C Spq
 

 C0 S
pq
 

S
pq
	 
ð21Þ
and the following S.O.C.:
Ωqqðq; SÞ ¼ ð2 pÞpαC00 Spq
 

S2
p2q3
> 0 ð22Þ
Let RðxÞ ; CðxÞ  xC0ðxÞ. Since Cð0Þ ¼ 0, C0 > 0, and C00 > 0, it follows that
RðxÞ < 0 for all x > 0 and R0 ¼ xC00ðxÞ < 0. Accordingly, when S is fixed at a
particular value, R and Ωqðq; SÞ are increasing in q. This implies that Ωqðq; SÞ is
maximized with respect to q when q ¼ 1. Hence, if for a given S, Ωqð1; SÞ < 0, then
Ωqðq0; SÞ < 0 for all q0. And if there exists S such that k ¼ RðSpÞ, then Ωqðq; SÞ < 0
for all S > S regardless of the level of q. But such S exists since C00ðs1Þ  a, where a
is a positive constant. To see this, note that R0 ¼ xC00ðxÞ < 0, hence
limx!1 R0ðxÞ ¼ 1; therefore R is divergent. Hence, there exists S such that
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k ¼ RðSpÞ. Therefore, whenever S  S, information costs are minimized when
qm ¼ 1, because, per the above observation, Ωqðq; SÞ < 0 for all S > S and for all q.
For any S0 such that 0 < S0 < S, there exists a unique and positive qm < 1
which satisfies k ¼ Rð S0pqmÞ. To see this, first note that  RðS
0
pÞ <  RðSpÞ ¼ k
where the inequality follows from the fact that R0 < 0, and the equality follows
from the definition of S. Next, note that since R is divergent, there exists q0 > 0
which is small enough such that  Rð S0pq0Þ > k. Combining these two results we
have that  RðS0pÞ < k <  Rð S
0
pq0Þ. By utilizing the intermediate value theorem,
and the fact that R0 < 0, it follows that there exists a unique qm such that
0 < q0 < qm < 1 and k ¼ Rð S0pqmÞ. Hence, for any S0 such that 0 < S0 < S, there
exists a unique and positive qm < 1 that minimizes information costs. ■
Proof of Proposition 2: Proposition 1 states that for all positive S < S, there is a
hybrid warning strategy that minimizes information costs. Hence, there is an
interior solution to the minimization problem in eq. (20). Let tðqm; SÞ ¼ ð2 pÞ
pα½k þ Cð SpqmÞ  C0ð SpqmÞ Spqm. Applying the implicit function theorem we have that:
 tS
tqm
¼ q
m
S
¼ dq
m
dS
ð23Þ
This is a simple first-order differential equation, whose solution is qm ¼ cS.
Where c is the unknown slope, describing qm as a function of S. But c must be
such that 1 ¼ cS, since by definition Ωqð1; SÞ ¼ 0. ■
Proof of Proposition 3: It should first be noted that the choice of s2 does not affect
information costs. Keeping this in mind, the proof consists of four steps. (1) First, I
will show that ps2 ¼ h gives uninformed individuals proper incentives. (2) Next, I
will show that whenever s1 is chosen such that qps1  h, it is welfare-maximizing to
set ps2 ¼ h. (3) Then, I will show that any punishment scheme where qps1 > h is
sub-optimal. These observations together imply that optimal sanction pairs and
warning strategies are such that s1  hqp , s2 ¼ hp . (4) Finally, I will show that given
s2 ¼ hp , expected sanctions for first-time offenders (qps1 ) must be set to balance
information costs and benefits from deterrence, which requires under-deterrence.
(1) p proportion of uninformed individuals are either warned or sanctioned in
the first period. These are transformed into informed individuals who face
expected punishments of ps2 in the event they commit crime in the second
period. Hence, setting ps2 ¼ h gives them proper incentives. ð1 pÞ
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proportion of uninformed individuals remain uninformed, and the choice of
s2 does not influence their behavior.
(2) Whenever, qps1 ¼ h, it trivially follows that s2 ¼ hp results in first-best
deterrence and that there is no other s2 that achieves the same result.
Whenever qps1 < h, by making use of Observation 2, and analyzing indivi-
duals’ responses to various sanctions, one can show that statements (a)–(d)
are true. The analysis showing how these statements follow is trivial and
lengthy and is therefore omitted in this article, but is available from the
author upon request.
(a) any sanction scheme where ps2 < qps1 is dominated by the sanctions
scheme with ps02 ¼ qps1.
(b) the sanction scheme where ps2 ¼ qps1 is dominated by the sanction
scheme with ps02 ¼ h.
(c) any sanction scheme where qps1 < ps2 < h is dominated by the sanc-
tion scheme with ps02 ¼ h.
(d) any sanction scheme where qps1 < h < ps2 is dominated by the sanc-
tion scheme with ps02 ¼ h.
Observations (a)–(d) together imply that whenever s1and q are chosen such
that qps1  h, it is optimal to set s2 ¼ h=p.
(3) It follows that any sanction pair such that qps1 > h is dominated by the
sanction pair s01 and s
0
2 satisfying qps
0
1 ¼ ps02 ¼ h, since the latter sanction
pair results in first-best deterrence in both periods and less informational
costs. Hence, any sanction pair where qps1 > h is sub-optimal.
(4) The above observations show that the optimal sanction pair is such that
s2 ¼ hp and pqs1  h. Given this observation, and the results from
Propositions 1 and 2, the claim can be proven as follows:
Let
IðSÞ ¼ min
q;s1
θðqÞΨðs1Þ such that S ¼ pqs1 ð24Þ
Then employing Observation 2 and the fact that ps2 ¼ h, social welfare can
be expressed as:
VðSÞ ¼ ð1 αÞ 2
ð1
h
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ ð2 pÞ
ðh
S
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb
	 
þ α ð2 pÞ
ð1
0
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ p
ð1
h
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb
	 
 IðSÞ
¼ K þ ð2 pÞð1 αÞ
ðh
S
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb IðSÞ
ð25Þ
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where
K ¼ ð1 αÞ2
ð1
h
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ α ð2 pÞ
ð1
0
ðb hÞf ðbÞdbþ p
ð1
h
ðb hÞf ðbÞdb
	 
:
Differentiating V with respect to S, we have50
VSðSÞ ¼
ð2 pÞð1 αÞðS hÞf ðSÞ  ð2 pÞpα 1S k þ CðSpÞ
 
if S  S  0
ð2 pÞð1 αÞðS hÞf ðSÞ  ð2 pÞαC0ðSpÞ if S > S
8><
>:
ð26Þ
Note that this expression is negative when S ¼ h (regardless of whether h > S).
Hence, it follows that the S maximizing this expression is such that S < h. In
other words, qps1 < h, which was the claim to be proven.
These observations together imply that the optimal sanction pair is such that
s1 <
h
qp and s

2 ¼ hp .
Proof of Proposition 4:
Part (i):
Small h: Since V is concave in S, it is always decreasing if VSð0Þ  0. But
VSð0Þ ¼ ð2 pÞð1 αÞhf ð0Þ  ð2 pÞ pαS k þ Cð
S
p
Þ
0
@
1
A  0 iff h  αpS k þ Cð
S
pÞ
 
ð1 αÞf ð0Þ ; h
0:
ð27Þ
Hence, for all h  h0, S ¼ 0 maximizes V.
Large h:
VSðSÞ  0 if h00 ; Sþ
αp
S k þ CðSpÞ
 
ð1 αÞf ðSÞ  h ð28Þ
Hence, for all h  h00, S, the maximizer of V, is such that S > S. Therefore,
per eq. (26) VSðSÞ ¼ 0 when ð1 αÞðh SÞf ðSÞ ¼ αC0ðSpÞ, which is when V is
maximized.
50 It should be noted that VðSÞ is differentiable. To see this, evaluate both expressions for VS at
S and verify that they are equal using the definition for S.
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Intermediate h: When h0 < h < h00, it follows that VSð0Þ > 0 > VSðSÞ. Hence, V
has a maximizer S, such that S > S > 0. Therefore, per eq. (26) VSðSÞ ¼ 0 when
ð1 αÞðh SÞf ðSÞ ¼ pα 1S k þ CðSpÞ
 
, which is when V is maximized.
Part (ii):
(1): Part (i) implies that S ¼ 0. In this case (per Proposition 1), the optimal
warning strategy is q ¼ 0.
(3): Part (i) implies that S > S. In this case (per Proposition 1), the optimal
warning strategy is q ¼ 1.
(2): Part (i) implies that 0 < S < S. In this case (per Proposition 1), the optimal
warning strategy is hybrid. To see that q is increasing in h, note that
dq
dh ¼ 1S dS

dh ¼  1S ½VShVSS ¼  1S
ð2pÞð1αÞf ðSÞ
VSS
> 0 since V is concave in S.
(4): Follows immediately from the expressions for h0 and h00 in eqs (27) and
(28). ■
Proof of Proposition 5: I will prove the claim by verifying the following four
observations: Escalating penalties are optimal when (i) pure warning strategies
are optimal (q ¼ 0), (ii) no-warning strategies are optimal ðq ¼ 1Þ, and (iii)
when hybrid strategies are optimal (0 < q < 1) and h > S. But (iv) decreasing or
uniform penalties are optimal when h  S and 0 < q < 1.
(i) When pure warnings are optimal, the choice of s1 is irrelevant (see
Proposition 1 part (iii)); in other words, any s1 is optimal. Therefore, it
trivially follows that there are optimal escalating sanctions.
(ii) It follows from Proposition 3 that s1pq
 < h ¼ s2p. But when no-warnings
are optimal, it follows that q ¼ 1; hence s1p < h ¼ s2p, which implies that
s1 < s

2 .
(iii) and (iv) When hybrid warning strategies are optimal, it follows that s1 ¼ Sp
(see Proposition 2) and that s2 ¼ hp (see Proposition 3). Hence, s1  s2 iff
S  h. ■
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